A batalha naval de Midway (1942): o papel da instituição no processo decisório da Almirante Isoroku Yamamoto

Abstract

The present research aims to analyze the influence of the intuitive and rational approaches on the decision-making processes of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, within a temporal framework encompassing both the planning and the actions undertaken during the Battle of Midway, which took place in 1942. This study seeks to enhance the understanding of events that occurred throughout the Second World War, which were also shaped by the actions implemented by the belligerent parties, thus providing valuable lessons for those entrusted with decision-making responsibilities. To this end, the study delves into the decision-making process of Admiral Yamamoto, covering the planning phase and the Japanese actions during the aforementioned battle, in light of the theoretical frameworks proposed by Max H. Bazerman and Don Moore in their book “Processo Decisório”, and by Daniel Kahneman in his book “Rápido e Devagar: Duas formas de pensar”. Upon comparing the events with the proposed theories, the research identified a stronger adherence to the intuitive decision-making approach, influenced by biases stemming from the availability, representativeness, and confirmation heuristics. It is therefore concluded that System 1 (intuitive) was predominant both in the planning phase and throughout the course of Japanese actions.