Campanhas em comparação no Atlântico Sul: como as operações anfíbias influenciaram a Guerra das Malvinas em 1982

Abstract

This study offers a comparative analysis of the Amphibious Operations conducted by Argentina and the United Kingdom during the Falklands War, with emphasis on their compositions, connection with the Landing Force, and degree of adherence to amphibious warfare doctrinal principles. The main objective is to identify the similarities and singularities between the models employed by both countries and how these differences influenced the course of the campaign. To that end, the methodology adopted is a comparative study based on bibliographic research and document analysis. The analysis is grounded in the doctrinal foundations of the Brazilian Navy to assess aspects such as unified command, fire support, logistics, interoperability, and flexibility. The results show that the British success stemmed from greater doctrinal adherence and a more cohesive logistical and command structure, while the Argentine failures were marked by logistical improvisation, discontinuity of command, and lack of long-term planning. Thus, this work provides relevant lessons for understanding the importance of adapting to the frictions and surprises inherent in a conflict.