Comando e controle dos submarinos britânicos e argentinos na Guerra das Malvinas

Abstract

The Falklands War, fought in 1982 between the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina, was a significant milestone in the study of Command and Control (C2) in Naval Operations, particularly in submarine employment. This research aimed to answer: How was submarine C2 conducted by both belligerents, and what was its impact on military operations during the conflict? This qualitative investigation, with an exploratory-descriptive approach, was based on primary and secondary sources, including official documents, adopting a case study strategy. Data analysis occurred in two stages: first, a C2-focused case study; second, a comparative analysis based on the decision-making process and the OODA loop. The findings indicate that, although both British and Argentine forces adopted land-based C2 authority, the tactical level experienced different degrees of freedom of action. This work offers a systematic overview of submarine employment in armed conflict, highlighting that C2 effectiveness depends not only on formal structure and components, but also on balanced integration between levels of war conduct and doctrine. It concludes that C2 is intrinsically linked to the chain of command, Rules of Engagement, technical limitations, and situational awareness across all levels. The study is expected to contribute to the field of Naval Operations by providing a structured analysis of C2 in attack submarine employment during armed conflict, engaging with doctrines adopted in the Falklands War, and offering reflections applicable to the Brazilian context. The findings aim to support doctrinal debate and scientific production on the subject.