O emprego do poder militar contra o terrorismo: lições das operações Entebe (1976) e Eagle Claw (1980) à luz da teoria de gestão de crises

Abstract

The terrorist phenomenon represents a persistent challenge to international security, requiring state responses that balance operational effectiveness in order to preservation of human lives. This study examined how applying Crisis Management Theory principles influences the success or failure of military operations to combat terrorism. The research tested the hypothesis that appropriate application of these principles leads to operational success, whereas their neglect results in failure. Using a qualitative comparative case study approach, the investigation analyzed two emblematic operations — Entebbe (1976) and Eagle Claw (1980) — situated at the transition between the Third and Fourth Waves of modern terrorism. Theoretical frameworks by Steven Fink (crisis phases), Herbert Simon (bounded rationality), Arjen Boin et al. (leadership tasks), and Bob Stewart (three-dimensional leadership model) were systematically applied. Findings show that Operation Entebbe succeeded due to its established organizational structure, simple planning, efficient information management, and balanced leadership. In contrast, Operation Eagle Claw failed catastrophically, reflecting excessive complexity, ad hoc structures, information management breakdowns, and leadership imbalances. Comparative analysis identified four critical contrasts—planning philosophies, organizational structures, information management, and leadership approaches. The study validates the hypothesis and concludes that operational simplicity, robust information protocols, and multidimensional leadership are essential for effective doctrines to combat terrorismo.