A guerra entre Ucrãnia e Rússia (2022-2023): abordagem da guerra na teoria realista do sistema internacional

Abstract

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine can be interpreted in light of the realist theory in International Relations, which argues that the war is the culmination of an evolutionary process of tensions. The analysis adopts a combined theoretical approach, applying the strands of Classical Realism by Hans Morgenthau, Defensive Neorealism by Kenneth Waltz, and Offensive Realism by John Mearsheimer to explain the different phases of Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin. Drawing from the complex historical context that shaped the perception of Ukraine as a vital buffer zone for Russia's security, the study demonstrates a gradual escalation. Initially, Morgenthau's lens elucidates the consolidation of Russian domestic power, exemplified by the Chechen War, as a prerequisite for the projection of external force. Subsequently, Waltz's theory explains the 2008 Georgia War as a defensive reaction to the security dilemma generated by NATO expansion. Finally, the work argues that Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism offers the most robust explanation for subsequent actions, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the large-scale invasion of 2022, interpreted as moves by a power-maximizing state in pursuit of regional hegemony. The response of the West, led by the U.S., is analyzed as a balancing coalition to contain Russian expansion. It is concluded that the war results from a transition from the restoration of internal order to the fear of encirclement and, subsequently, to a revisionist ambition.