Além da fricção clausewitziana: o papel determinante das forças de operações especiais britânicas nas Malvinas como multiplicadores de força

Abstract

This paper examines the critical role of the employment of the United Kingdom's Special Operations Forces (SOF) during the Falklands War (1982). The research confronts theory, based on the Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (SOFRM) and Robert G. Spulak Jr.'s work, with the empirical reality of operations executed by the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS). The study demonstrates that British SOF acted as a decisive force multiplier, transcending the tactical level and influencing the operational, strategic, and political tiers of the conflict. Operations such as the recapture of South Georgia, the attack on Pebble Island, and the reconnaissance of San Carlos Bay highlight these forces' capability to fill intelligence gaps and conduct high-value direct actions in hostile environments. The research validates principles like overcoming clausewitzian friction and the primacy of individual proficiency, adaptability, and discretion. The analysis emphasizes the flexibility and asymmetry of SOF, capable of alternating between Direct Actions (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR), shaping the battlefield. The conclusions offer valuable lessons for the doctrinal enhancement of the Brazilian Navy's SOF, underscoring their continuous relevance in scenarios of national interest defense, such as amphibious and insular environments.