A estratégia terrestre de Israel na Guerra dos Seis Dias: uma análise à luz da teoria de Cluasewitz

Abstract

This dissertation aims to analyze the land strategy adopted by Israel during the Six-Day War, which took place between June 5 and 10, 1967, in light of the classical principles of Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of war. It is a theoretical and analytical study that seeks to understand to what extent the Clausewitzian fundamentals, notably war as a continuation of politics, the attack on the center of gravity, the use of surprise, operational mobility, and the decisive offensive, are reflected in the practical conduct of Israeli operations throughout the conflict. To this end, the research adopts a methodological approach that combines conceptual examination of Clausewitz’s writings with a historical-strategic analysis of the Israeli case, using as primary references his work On War and the detailed study of Michael Oren on the 1967 events. The investigation assumes that Israel’s victory cannot be explained solely by technical factors such as technological superiority or logistical efficiency, but rather by the consistent application of a strategic logic closely aligned with Clausewitzian principles. In this sense, the study demonstrates that Israeli military decisions, from the preventive offensive to the coordinated campaigns across the Sinai, West Bank, and Golan Heights, exhibit a high degree of political rationality and doctrinal integration, which grant the campaign lasting analytical relevance. In addition to answering the central research question, the dissertation offers a critical reflection on the enduring relevance of Clausewitz’s thought as a valid instrument for interpreting and planning modern conflicts. Israel’s 1967 land strategy is thus presented as a historical example of the practical applicability of classical principles of the art of war, underscoring their utility within the field of contemporary strategic and doctrinal studies.