Centros de gravidade na Guerra das Malvinas (1982): uma análise sob a ótica da arte operacional

Abstract

The study analyzes the amphibious operations Rosario and Corporate, undertaken by Argentina and the United Kingdom respectively in the Malvinas War (1982), from the perspective of Operational Art, using the theoretical models of Arthur Lykke and Dale Eikmeier as references. The central objective was to identify the centers of gravity of these operations and examine how their protection or exploitation decisively influenced the outcome of the conflict. The research adopted an analytical approach, using primary sources such as official reports, specialized literature and military doctrines, with an emphasis on the ends-ways-means conceptual model and the method of identifying Centers of Gravity through the study of critical factors. The study showed that Operation Rosario, despite its initial success, suffered from a lack of interoperability, logistical deficiencies and centralized decision-making, which resulted in the progressive exposure of its center of gravity, identified as the military ground device in Port Stanley. In contrast, Operation Corporate showed operational structuring, effectively protecting its centers of gravity at different stages of the campaign. The analysis made it possible to draw doctrinal lessons relevant to contemporary military planning, highlighting the importance of: cohesion between ends, ways and means; correct identification and protection of centers of gravity; and the vital need for interoperability and joint command in expeditionary and amphibious operations.