A guerra de Yom Kippur: as falhas de inteligência israelenses à luz da doutrina brasileira

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the failure of Israeli military intelligence during the Yom Kippur War (1973), one of the most emblematic events of strategic surprise in the twentieth century, in light of the doctrinal principles of Brazilian military intelligence. The research is based on the premise that certain concepts found in Brazilian doctrine — such as the variety of analytical hypotheses, the functional separation between intelligence and counterintelligence, the structuring of the intelligence cycle, and the recognition of surprise as a permanent risk — could have contributed to reducing the effects of the surprise suffered by Israel. The methodology is grounded in the confrontation between Theory and Reality, critically applying Brazilian theoretical foundations to the historical reality of the Israeli case. The study is divided into three parts: first, the presentation of the theoretical foundations of intelligence activity, focusing on the Brazilian doctrine; second, the analysis of the scenario, institutions, and factors that led to the Israeli failure; and third, the application of Brazilian principles to the case, including a counterfactual exercise and discussion of contextual limitations. The aim is to reflect on the potential of Brazilian doctrine to promote greater institutional sensitivity to warning signs and strengthen critical review mechanisms in intelligence systems, as demonstrated in the study of the Israeli case, especially in contemporary strategic contexts.