Logística em operações anfíbias: da experiência britânica nas Malvinas à realidade em Fernando de Noronha

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes logistical support in long-distance amphibious operations, using the British experience in the Falklands War (1982) as a basis for comparison with the challenges Brazil would face in the eventual reconquest of the oceanic island of Fernando de Noronha. Employing a comparative method and grounded in Geoffrey Till’s theory on naval power projection, the research combines doctrinal data, military documents, and specialized literature. The analysis shows that British success resulted from integrated national mobilization, the use of forward operating bases, the incorporation of civilian resources, and allied support. In contrast, it concludes that the Brazilian Navy’s logistical structure presents significant limitations, such as the absence of a forward base in Fernando de Noronha, near-total dependence on continental support, and a shortage of specialized means. The study reinforces the centrality of logistics in amphibious operations and highlights the need to strengthen SINAMOB, invest in island infrastructure, and consolidate doctrine to ensure operational readiness. It thus contributes to improving the Brazilian Navy’s logistical planning in territorial defense scenarios in isolated areas.