Guerra das Malvinas: um panorama sobre as armas de apoio nas operações anfíbias

Abstract

This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the employment of fire support assets during the amphibious operations (OpAnf) conducted by Argentina and the United Kingdom in the Falklands War (1982), with a focus on Naval Gunfire Support (ApFN), Field Artillery Support (ArtCmp), and Air Support (ApAe). The research is grounded in the doctrine of the Brazilian Marine Corps (CFN), particularly in the manuals CGCFN-50, CGCFN-50.1, CGCFN-50.2, and CGCFN-34.1, which define the principles, methods, and procedures for the planning and coordination of fire support in OpAnf. Chapter 2 presents this doctrinal framework in depth, while Chapters 3 and 4 describe, based on historical documents and specialized sources, the concrete actions executed by both belligerents during the landing operations at Port Stanley, Grytviken, Pebble Island, and San Carlos. Chapter 5 provides the comparative analysis in light of the CFN doctrine. It was found that the United Kingdom effectively employed its support assets, integrating them with a high degree of interoperability and coordination across command echelons, which ensured operational superiority. In contrast, Argentina displayed logistical and command limitations that undermined the effectiveness of its offensive and defensive actions. The study concludes that the proper employment of fire support assets, with emphasis on coordination, timely action, and integration among resources, is a decisive factor for success amphibious operations.