Forças de operações especiais argentinas nas Malvinas: o predomínio dos impactos operacionais e das ações de reconhecimento

Abstract

The dissertation investigates the employment of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the Argentine Navy during the 1982 Falklands War, from the preliminary actions in the South Georgia Islands to the British operations to retake Port Stanley. The results show that the Argentine SOF demonstrated effectiveness when employed within the theoretical support principles. In Operation Rosario, special reconnaissance and direct action were combined to capture Port Stanley, with minimal damage and no civilian casualties. On the other hand, operations outside the principles in South Georgia revealed limitations and vulnerabilities. In San Carlos, the high cost and wear of prolonged reconnaissance actions were evident. Operation Buitre exemplified logistical and planning challenges that led to the mission’s cancellation. The research highlights that the employment of SOF reflected decisions at multiple command levels, showing greater impact at the operational level, followed by the political and strategic levels, with less tactical repercussion. Furthermore, reconnaissance actions predominated over direct actions. Gaps in Argentine doctrine, reliance on specialized means for infiltration and extraction, and the need for unified command to integrate different forces and maximize effectiveness were evidenced. The conclusions provide support for the doctrinal and operational development of similar institutions, emphasizing the importance of preparation, proper employment of specific capabilities, and effective integration at the different levels of war management to maximize the strategic effects of special operations.