Do mar para terra: a teoria do poder marítimo de Mahan e o emprego do conjugado anfíbio pelos EUA na campanha do Pacífico

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the employment of the amphibious task force by the United States Armed Forces during the Pacific campaign, in the context of the Second World War, considering Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of sea power. The study is based on the hypothesis that Mahanian principles—particularly the control of strategic positions and the use of advanced bases—had a significant influence on the conduct of amphibious operations, integrated into the “island-hopping” strategy adopted by the United States. To this end, a qualitative, descriptive, and analytical approach was employed, grounded in historical-strategic research with documentary and doctrinal analysis. Three specific campaigns were examined: the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, the Mariana Islands, and the Battle of Iwo Jima, focusing on the role of the amphibious task force in the conquest of fortified coastal areas, the establishment of logistical bases, and the maintenance of maritime lines of communication. The results show that the practical application of the Allied strategy demonstrated significant adherence to the theoretical foundations formulated by Mahan, confirming the relevance of his thought to the understanding of large-scale naval operations. It is concluded that the amphibious task force constituted a decisive operational instrument for projecting naval power in the Pacific, enabling the transition from maritime control to territorial control, an essential condition for the Allied victory.