A influência das interações entre os contextos interno e externo na formulação da política externa: o caso argentino na guerra das Malvinas (1976-1982)

Abstract

The decision by the Argentine military junta to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982 resulted from a complex interaction between domestic and international factors. This dissertation analyzes how internal legitimacy crises—exacerbated by economic instability, political repression, and declining social support—converged with diplomatic isolation and a deadlock in negotiations with the United Kingdom, culminating in military action. Based on Robert Putnam’s two-level games theory, the research investigates how the elements of the win-set—domestic preferences and coalitions, internal institutions, and negotiation strategies—were articulated in the Argentine context from 1976 to 1982. The study is organized in three parts: presentation of the theoretical framework; analysis of Argentina’s political, economic, and social conditions; and examination of the country’s international positioning and diplomatic negotiations over the Falkland issue. It concludes that Argentine foreign policy, even under an authoritarian regime, was constrained by internal factors, and that the invasion was an extreme attempt to regain domestic support through symbolic nationalist mobilization.