Guerra das Malvinas (1982): uma análise do comando e controle à luz da teoria de John Boyd

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the Falklands War (1982) from the perspective of Command and Control, using John Boyd’s Theory as the theoretical framework, with special emphasis on the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act). The study focuses on the actions of the Royal Navy, examining how its commanders faced a complex, uncertain, and distant combat environment that demanded rapid decisions, effective coordination, and adaptive capacity. Initially, the theoretical foundation is presented, detailing the OODA loop, its conceptual basis, and its applications to Command and Control, highlighting the importance of flexible orientation and decentralized decision-making. Then, the Falklands War is contextualized, addressing the historical origins of the dispute, the political and military scenario, the British mobilization, and the operational particularities. The central analysis confronts theory with reality, evaluating British operations from the deployment to the South Atlantic, the use of submarines, the coordination of task forces, and the adjustments made in the face of logistical and tactical challenges. The study highlights how the tactical freedom granted to field commanders and the integration of strategic information provided an advantage over the Argentine forces, whose rigid decision-making structures limited their effectiveness.