A guerra que os números não venceram: do sucesso tático ao fracasso estratégico na guerra do Vietnã (1967-1969)

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the critical dissonance between military performance measurement and the reality of irregular warfare. It argues that the reliance on quantitative indicators, such as the body count in the Vietnam War, created a dangerous illusion of progress, masking strategic failure by ignoring decisive political and social factors. Analyzing Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City (1967-1969) through a qualitative case study, the research exposes how military assessment theory and battlefield practice catastrophically diverged. The results reveal that performance assessment transformed into a ritual of legitimation. Tactical victories, celebrated based on casualty statistics, masked the looming strategic collapse. The attrition strategy, while generating impressive numbers, proved counterproductive by alienating the civilian population, whose support was the true center of gravity of the conflict. Doctrinal rigidity prevented strategic adaptation to the enemy's guerrilla tactics, while the battle for narratives was lost when the media exposed the brutality on the ground, eroding the public and political legitimacy of the war effort. In sum, the work concludes that in asymmetric scenarios, a fixation on quantifiable metrics can lead to failure, even in the face of tactical successes. The lesson, of direct relevance to the contemporary missions of the Brazilian Navy, is the imperative need for a comprehensive assessment model. This model must integrate qualitative, political, and human dimensions to achieve real and lasting strategic effectiveness.